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Summary
In this paper the scope of Bergstrom’s (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis
is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions.
For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant
tariff if extraction is costless. However, with depletion effects, the optimal tariff must
ultimately be decreasing. For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend
crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on
whether the monopolist chooses the price or extraction rate. For a price-setting
monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture
monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies, even if the
governments sign a tariff agreement. This result is drastically modified if the importing
countries in the tariff agreement use Markov (feedback) strategies. For a quantity-
setting monopolist the nature of the game changes and the importing country
governments find it advantageous to set a tariff on resource importations. Moreover, in
this case the importing countries in a tariff agreement enjoy a strategic advantage which
allows them to behave as a leader.
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The issue of using an import tariﬀ to capture nonrenewable resource rents
was addressed sometime ago in a nice piece of work by Bergstrom (1982).
In his paper, he shows that if all importing countries of a competitively
supplied nonrenewable resource select the same ad valorem tariﬀ on the re-
source consumed at any time, the tariﬀ is advantageous for the importing
countries in the sense that they capture resource rents from the exporting
countries. He characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the game among the im-
porting countries by a simple rule relating the equilibrium ad valorem tariﬀ
to demand elasticities and market shares. In the second part of the paper,
he argues that almost all the proﬁts of a monopolist can be taxed away by
the importing countries if they choose a suﬃciently high tariﬀ as long as
the proﬁt-maximizing level of the monopolist’s price is independent of the
tariﬀ. These results are obtained for a Hotelling-type model with a costlessly
extracted nonrenewable resource. Later, several papers addressed this issue,
among them Brander and Djajic (1983), Karp (1984), Maskin and Newbery
(1990), Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992).1 However only a few authors have
used for their analysis the game among n importing countries proposed by
Bergstrom. In particular, Karp and Newbery (1991) have characterized the
Markov equilibria of two games in which large importers who behave strate-
gically confront competitive suppliers of a nonrenewable resource and the
marginal extraction cost is positive but constant. For the game where im-
porters move ﬁrst, they integrate numerically the pair of ordinary diﬀerential
equations that characterize the perfect, importers move ﬁrst equilibrium. For
the other game, where exporters move ﬁrst, as the importers have no inﬂu-
ence on the dynamics of the resource, the importers choose at each moment
at a r i ﬀ to maximize the instantaneous domestic welfare taking as given the
extraction rate and the rival’s tariﬀs .T h er e s u l ti st h a tt h et a r i ﬀ is given by
the Nash equilibrium of a static game among the importers.
In this paper we study the scope of the results obtained by Bergstrom
using the theory of diﬀerential games. Moreover, we extend his analysis
by assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extrac-
tions (depletion eﬀects). When large importers confront competitive suppli-
ers we show that the open-loop Nash equilibrium tariﬀ is constant only if
the marginal extraction cost is zero, which is Bergstrom’s conclusion. We
1A recent contribution by H¨ orner and Kamien (2004) shows that the intertemporal
no-arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a
price path mirrors the intertemporal no-arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of
an exhaustible resource supplied by competitive sellers can commit to a proﬁle of import
tariﬀs.
3also ﬁnd that if the marginal extraction cost is positive but constant then
the optimal tariﬀ is increasing. Finally, with depletion eﬀects the optimal
tariﬀ must ultimately be decreasing. This is an immediate consequence of
the fact that the long-run value of the tariﬀ rate is zero because of the eco-
nomic exhaustion of the resource, which requires that in the long run the
marginal extraction cost be equal to the backstop price. This means that
the resource rent vanishes in the long run and no tariﬀ can be applied. Our
approach of the intertemporal competitive analysis is very similar to the one
proposed in the second part of Karp and Newbery’s (1991) paper where the
importers move ﬁrst and the game amongst importers is truly dynamic, al-
though we think that as the consumers in the importing countries and the
producers in the exporting countries act parametrically with respect to the
price, it is not necessary to assume that the importers move ﬁrst to get a
diﬀerential game amongst the governments of the importing countries. As
we show, the application of the market equilibrium condition at each point
in time is enough to yield a diﬀerential game amongst the importing country
governments. In other words, as consumers and producers of the resource
take the price as given there is no strategic interdependence amongst them,
so that only when the equilibrium price clears the market does a strategic
interdependence appear amongst the governments of the importing countries
through their inﬂuence on the market equilibrium and hence on the resource
dynamics, i.e., the only game that can appear in an international compet-
itive resource market with large importers, without the intervention of the
governments of the exporting countries, is amongst the governments of the
importing countries.
I nt h es e c o n dp a r to ft h i sp a p e rw es t u d yt h em o n o p o l yc a s eu s i n ga
diﬀerential game among n importing countries and the monopolist. Contrary
to the results obtained by Bergstrom, we ﬁnd that the proﬁt-maximizing level
of the monopolist’s price is not independent of the tariﬀ. However, our results
establish that importing countries cannot use the tariﬀ to capture part of the
monopoly’s rents, i.e., that the open-loop Nash equilibrium tariﬀ is zero. This
result appears because the user cost for the importing countries is equal to the
tariﬀ times the monopoly price and because the extraction cost is supported
by the monopolist. In this case the user cost for importing countries must
increase at a rate equal to the interest rate but this is incompatible with the
fact that ultimately the rent must be zero because of the economic exhaustion
of the resource. We also ﬁnd that this result applies for a per unit tariﬀ
and when the importing countries cooperate imposing the same tariﬀ rate
on the resource importations, i.e., when the importing country governments
sign a tariﬀ agreement, and independently of whether it is assumed that the
countries are symmetric or not.
4In order to clarify whether this result is a consequence of the equilibrium
concept used to solve the game, we propose a diﬀerential game between a
monopolist and a coalition of importing country governments for which it is
possible to calculate the stationary linear Markov strategies. The solution
to this game establishes that the importing countries can capture part of the
monopoly’s rents for their consumer using a tariﬀ on the resource importa-
tions. Thus, we ﬁnd that when the monopolist chooses a pricing policy the
tariﬀ is advantageous for the importing countries if the importing countries
co-operate through a tariﬀ agreement and the optimal policy is deﬁned using
a feedback strategy.
Finally, we examine the case of a quantity-setting monopolist. For this
case, as the importing countries have no inﬂuence on the dynamics of the
stock, the game among the importing countries becomes, in fact, a static
game and given the inﬂuence of the tariﬀ rate on the monopoly price the
importing countries ﬁnd it advantageous to set a tariﬀ on the resource impor-
tations.2 On the other hand, if the governments of the importing countries
sign a tariﬀ agreement it is pretty obvious that the open-loop Nash equi-
librium policy is to choose, for a given extraction rate, a tariﬀ such that
the monopolist’s price be zero, but then the monopoly is not interested in
exploiting the resource so that ﬁnally the consumers of the importing coun-
tries are not going to enjoy any surplus. However, the coalition has another
alternative since the importing country governments, in fact, enjoy a strate-
gic advantage given that they can inﬂuence the monopoly price through the
tariﬀ. In other words, the importing country governments have another alter-
native because the coalition can behave as a leader. To conclude the analysis
we calculate the stationary Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium in linear
strategies which guarantees the strong time consistency of the tariﬀ,a n dw e
obtain that the importing countries are interested in setting a tariﬀ that pro-
vides the monopoly with the possibility of obtaining a positive price with the
aim of getting a positive surplus for their consumers. A policy that clearly
is superior to the one derived from the open-loop Nash equilibrium.3
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, Section 2, the
intertemporal competitive analysis is developed. In Section 3 the case of a
2This is the same result as the one obtained by Karp and Newbery (1991) when com-
petitive suppliers move ﬁrst in the game. However, we get it here as a consequence of the
fact that the monopolist uses the extraction rate as a control variable.
3This kind of diﬀerential game between a quantity-setting monopolist (the follower)
and a tariﬀ-setting buyer (the leader) has been studied by Karp (1984). In that paper, he
shows that the open-loop Stackelberg tariﬀ is inconsistent because of the stock-dependence
of extraction costs. Besides, he proposes an alternative method to the one used in this
paper, see Prop. 2 on page 87, of obtaining temporally consistent strategies.
5price-setting monopolist is studied and the case of a quantity-setting monop-
olist is dealt with in Section 4. The comparison between the Markov-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the diﬀerential game where the monopolist sets up the
price and the Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium where the monopolist
sets up the extraction rate appears in Section 5. Conclusions and subjects
for future research are presented in Section 6.
2 Intertemporal Competitive Analysis
As in Bergstrom’s (1982) analysis, we shall conﬁne ourselves to a partial equi-
librium model. Assuming that the representative consumer of the importing
country acts as a price-taker agent, we can write the consumer’s welfare func-
tion as Ui(qi)−p(1+θi)qi+Ri, where Ui(qi) is the consumer’s gross surplus,
qi the amount of the resource bought by the representative consumer of the
importing country i, p the international price of the resource, θi the “ad
valorem” tariﬀ rate on the resource imports ﬁxed by the government of the
importing country i,a n dRi a lump-sum transfer that the consumer receives
from the government. Thus, the resource demand depends only on the con-
sumer price: U0
i(qi)=p(1 + θi)a n dt h ed e m a n df u n c t i o nc a nb ew r i t t e na s
qi = Di(p(1 + θi)) with D0
i < 0 if the marginal utility is decreasing.4 Thus
the aggregate demand is QD =
Pn
i=1 Di(p(1 + θi)).
On the other side of the market we have m identical competitive exporting
countries extracting the resource at an aggregate cost equal to c(x)Q, where
c(x) is the marginal extraction cost, with c0 > 0a n dc00 ≥ 0,xstands for
the accumulated extractions and Q for the current extraction rate of the











s.t. ˙ x = Q
S,x (0) = x0 ≥ 0,
where r is the market rate of interest and QS the aggregate supply of the
resource. The solution of this model is well known, and yields a modiﬁed





i stands for the derivative of the demanded quantity with respect to the consumer
price: p(1 + θi).
6i.e., the total return associated with holding a unit of stock must equal the
market rate of interest. With depletion eﬀects the total return includes the
capital gains plus the reduction in the total extraction cost resulting from
that unit. This equation can be written in terms of the price change rate
˙ p = r(p − c(x)), (1)
so that the competitive supply is characterized by the following system of
diﬀerential equations
˙ x = Q
S, ˙ p = r(p − c(x)).
In order to close the model the market clearing condition must be im-
posed, which requires that the demand be equal to the supply at each mo-
ment. This condition yields the following diﬀerential equation







where p∗ is the competitive equilibrium price in the world market. This equa-
tion along with (1) show that the competitive equilibrium dynamics depends
on the tariﬀ imposed by the importing countries. This is a consequence of the
fact that both the consumers in the importing countries and the producers
in the exporting countries act parametrically, i.e., they take prices as given
and choose quantities, the demand and the supply of the resource. So, as
the demand depends on the tariﬀ rate set by the governments of the import-
ing countries, ﬁnally the market equilibrium condition at each point in time
yields a dynamic game among the importing country governments. In this
context, if the governments set the tariﬀ with the aim of maximizing the dis-
counted present value of the representative consumer’s welfare (= consumer
surplus + tariﬀ revenues), the optimal time path for the tariﬀ is given by the







−rt(Ui(Di(p(1 + θi))) − pDi(p(1 + θi)))dt,
5It is assumed that the tariﬀ revenues are reimbursed to the consumers as lump-sum
transfers, i.e., that pθiqi = Ri. In order to simplify the notation we omit the asterisk over
the price. It should be understood that p in the optimal control problem is the competitive
equilibrium international price.
7s.t. ˙ x = Q =
n X
j=1
Dj(p(1 + θj)),x (0) = x0 ≥ 0,
˙ p = r(p − c(x)).
2 . 1 T h eO p e n - l o o pN a s hE q u i l i b r i u m
In this section the diﬀerential game is solved using open-loop strategies. Al-
though open-loop strategies do not guarantee the subgame perfection (strong
time consistency), they are easy to compute and allow us to obtain some an-
alytical results about the dynamics of the tariﬀ with depletion eﬀects.
First, we deﬁne the Hamiltonian associated to the optimal control prob-
lems presented in the previous section.












i − p + ηi1)=0 , (2)
˙ ηi1 = r(ηi1 + ηi2c
0), (3)












where (2) and (4) can be simpliﬁed using U0
i = p(1 + θi), resulting in
pθi = −ηi1, (5)
˙ ηi2 = −pθi(1 + θi)D
0






(5) deﬁnes the standard condition which establishes that the optimal tariﬀ
must be equal to the user cost of the resource.6






so that the following result can be established
6See (7) in Maskin and Newbery (1990).
8Proposition 1 When the marginal extraction cost is constant, i.e., without
depletion eﬀects c0 =0 , the open-loop Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rate is increas-
ing and its rate of growth is ˙ θi/θi = rc/p.
Moreover, we have
Corollary 1 (Bergstrom (1982)) If c =0 , i.e., when extraction is costless,
the open-loop Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rate is constant.
This conclusion provides Bergstrom’s result with generality. In his paper
it is written that: “The optimal tax rate found in equation (32) has only been
shown to be the optimal constant tax rate. More generally we could allow the
possibility that a country could choose a schedule of changing tax rates over
time” (Bergstrom (1982, p. 198)). Here we allow for this possibility since
we do not impose any ap r i o r idynamics for the tax rate as in Bergstrom’s
paper and we ﬁnd that the optimal open-loop tariﬀ rate must be constant.7
2.2 The Optimal Open-loop Tariﬀ with Depletion Ef-
fects
With depletion eﬀects a system of 3n+2 equations, (3)-(5)-(6) for i =1 ,...,n
and the two dynamic constraints, must be analyzed. Since this is a rather
diﬃcult task to tackle we propose a simpliﬁcation assuming that all the
representative consumers of the diﬀerent importing countries are identical.
Thus, next, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium. Assuming that all the
consumers are identical and that θ = θ1 = ... = θn the open-loop Nash
equilibrium is given by the following system of diﬀerential equations:
˙ x = nD(p(1 + θ)), (7)






˙ η2 = D +( n − 1)pθ(1 + θ)D
0, (10)
where pθ = −η1 has been used to simplify (6).
7In Bergstrom’s analysis it is assumed that: i) A constant excise tax rate is imposed by
each country in all periods; ii) All importing countries impose the same excise tax rate on
the resource consumed at any time. See again Bergstrom (1982, pp. 196-7). In Kemp and
Long (1980), it is also shown that the open-loop tariﬀ must be constant when extraction
is costless and increasing when the marginal extraction cost is constant for the case of a
monopsonistic importing country.
9The steady state of this system is easily calculated, resulting in θ
∞ =
η∞
2 =0 ,p ∞ = c(x∞)a n dD(p∞)=0 .8 Using these values we can evaluate
the Jacobian matrix of the system (7)-(8)-(9)-(10) at the steady state and














Then the characteristic roots ρk (k =1 ,...,4) are the solutions of the char-
acteristic equation
ρ
4 − (tr J)ρ
3 + Ψρ




















Ψ and Π being the sum of all diagonal second and third order minors of J.






























since p∞ = c(x∞)a tt h es t e a d ys t a t e ,a n d
8Notice that the condition D0 = D = 0 would leave the steady-state values of p and θ
undetermined. D(p(1 + θ)) = 0 yields p =¯ p/(1 + θ)w h e r e¯ p is the intersection point of
the demand function with the price axis (backstop price). Then by substitution in D0 we
would obtain D0(¯ p)=0 .
10Ω




Then we have that the eigenvalues of J are real, two being positive and two
being negative (Dockner (1985, Th. 3) and that the suﬃcient conditions for
the (local) saddle point property are satisﬁed (Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen
(1993, Lemma 1)), this means that the system (7)-(8)-(9)-(10) has a unique
steady state that is a saddle point.
This stability analysis allows us to conclude that
Proposition 2 The open-loop Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rate with depletion ef-
fects is ultimately decreasing.
This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the steady-state value
of the tariﬀ rate is zero. With a steady-sate value equal to zero the tariﬀ
must be decreasing when it is approaching the long-run equilibrium.
3 The Case of a Price-setting Monopolist
When the governments of the importing countries face a monopoly the nature
of the game changes. Now the game has another player, the monopolist, who















s.t. ˙ x = Q =
n X
i=1
Di(p(1 + θi)),x (0) = x0 ≥ 0.
On the other hand, the governments of the importing countries ﬁx, as
before, a tariﬀ in order to maximize the discounted present value of the
representative consumer’s welfare. Now both types of players face the same
dynamic constraint and the optimal time path for the tariﬀ is given by the
solution of a diﬀerential game between the monopolist and the n importing
countries.
113 . 1 T h eO p e n - l o o pN a s hE q u i l i b r i u m
First, we write the Hamiltonian associated to the optimal control problems
of the importing countries.




which yields the following necessary conditions
pθi = −λi, ˙ λi = rλi, (13)
which establish that the price is a strategic substitute of the tariﬀ rate. Notice
that now, as the extraction costs are supported directly by the monopolist,
the tariﬀ, pθi, must increase at the interest rate.
For the monopolist the Hamiltonian is




and the necessary conditions are
n X
i=1





i =0 , (14)





where (14) is the instantaneous reaction function of the monopoly. By dif-





i +( p − c + λM)(D0










a n ds ow ec a ne s t a b l i s ht h a t
Proposition 3 If the demand functions are concave, D00
i ≤ 0, the tariﬀ rate
of one importing country is a strategic substitute of the monopoly price.
12With D00
i ≤ 0, the numerator and the denominator of (16) are negative
since by (14) (p−c+λM)m u s tb ep o s i t i v e .M o r e o v e r ,i ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t
(14) is the standard condition that characterizes the monopoly equilibrium:
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, now including the user cost of the





+ p = c − λM,







= c − λM = MC,
where εQ,p is the elasticity of the aggregate demand function.
A si nt h ep r e v i o u sg a m ew eh a v eas y s t e mo f2 n+3 equations to calculate
the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
pθi = −λi,i =1 ,...,n, (17)



















In order to calculate the steady state we have to take into account that
the diﬀerent countries can have diﬀerent backstop prices. In this case, what is
going to occur is that the countries are going to leave the market sequentially
as the monopoly price reaches its backstop price so that the steady state






M =0 ,i=1 ,...,n, p∞ = c(x∞)a n d
Dj(p∞)=0w h e r ej is the country with the highest backstop price.9 Then
it is straightforward that
9We are aware that the nature of the game can change when the number of countries
i nt h em a r k e ti sl o wb e c a u s et h e nt h ea s s u m p t i on of a price-taker representative consumer
cannot work. In order to avoid this problem we assume that there are diﬀerent types of
countries with a very similar backstop price so that there are always enough countries
in the market to support the assumption of a price-taker behaviour. Another possibility
is to assume that in each country there are enough consumers to make the competitive
assumption acceptable. This problem will not appear if the available backstop technology
is the same for all countries.
13Proposition 4 The governments of the importing countries cannot capture
t h er e s o u r c er e n tu s i n gat a r i ﬀ, in other words, the open-loop Nash equilibrium
tariﬀ rate with depletion eﬀects is zero.
This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the tariﬀ, pθi, must in-
crease at a constant rate which is incompatible with the fact that ultimately
the tariﬀ rate must be zero because of the economic exhaustion of the re-
source. Notice that the price cannot be zero since at the steady state it is
equal to the marginal extraction cost. Thus the unique path that can con-
verge to the steady state requires that θi = λi = 0 throughout the exploita-
tion period of the resource and the system (17)-(18)-(19)-(20)-(21) yields the
standard solution for the monopolistic extraction with depletion eﬀects. As
long as this argument does not depend on the cost structure, the result will
also be valid when there are no depletion eﬀects. It will be valid as well
even if the importing countries cooperate imposing the same tariﬀ rate on
the resource importations, i.e., even if the importing country governments
sign a tariﬀ agreement and independently of whether we assume that they
are symmetric or not. It is easy to show that the previous result also applies
to the case of a per unit tariﬀ since all the analysis for the per unit tariﬀ is
identical to the one developed in this section simply substituting pθi by the
p e ru n i tt a r i ﬀ.
3.2 A Tariﬀ Agreement: The Markov-perfect Nash
Equilibrium
Next, we want to investigate whether this last result is a consequence of the
equilibrium concept used to solve the game. To do so we propose in this
section a game for which it is possible to calculate the stationary Markovian
(feedback) strategies. Now we assume that the governments of the importing
countries sign an agreement to impose the same per unit tariﬀ on the resource
importations with the aim of maximizing the discounted present value of the
sum of the aggregate consumer’s welfare.10 In order to obtain an analytical
solution for the game we also assume that the consumer’s gross surplus is
given by Ui(qi)=aqi −(1/2)q2
i and that the extraction cost is linear, c(x)=
cx. With these changes we have a diﬀerential game between a monopolist
and a coalition of the importing country governments that can be written as
follows for the monopolist,
10As we have obtained the same qualitative results both for an ad valorem tariﬀ and
f o rap e ru n i tt a r i ﬀ, the change in the speciﬁcation of the tariﬀ does not suppose a strong
discontinuity in the analysis developed in this paper. Besides, a per unit tariﬀ allows us






−rt((p − cx)n(a − p − θ))dt, (22)








(a − p)(a − p − θ) −
1
2




the dynamic constraint being
s.t. ˙ x = Q = n(a − p − θ),x (0) = x0 ≥ 0. (24)
Markov strategies must satisfy the following system of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations:





(a − p)(a − p − θ) −
1
2





An(a − p − θ)}, (25)
rWM =m a x
{p}
{(p − cx)n(a − p − θ)+W
0
Mn(a − p − θ)}, (26)
where WM(x) stands for the optimal current value functions associated with
the dynamic optimization problem for the monopoly (22) and WA(x)f o rt h e
optimal current value functions associated with the dynamic optimization
problem for the agreement (23); i.e., they denote the maxima of the objectives
(22) and (23) subject to (24) for the current value of the state variable.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximization of the right-hand
sides of the HJB equations, we get the instantaneous reaction functions of







(a + cx − W
0
M − θ). (28)
These expressions establish that the optimal tariﬀ is independent of the
monopoly price and equal, as before, to the user cost of the resource for
the importing countries, and that the price and the tariﬀ are strategic sub-
stitutes for the monopolist.
By substitution of (27) and (28), we get the solution of the price as a func-
tion of the ﬁrst derivatives of the value functions: p = 1
2 (a + cx − W0
M + W0
A).
15Next, by incorporating the optimal strategies into the HJB Eqs. (25) and
(26), we eliminate the maximization and obtain, after some calculations, a



















In order to derive the solution to this system of diﬀerential equations, we









2 + βMx + µM, (31)
and we apply the same procedure as the one used by Wirl and Dockner (1995)
to calculate the coeﬃcients, see Appendix A. Substituting these coeﬃcients in
(27) and (28), we obtain the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strate-

























By visual inspection it can be seen that the tariﬀ is inversely related to
the accumulated extractions whereas the price increases with the exploitation
of the resource. Now using the equilibrium strategies, diﬀerential equation
(24) can be solved, yielding








































11In order to simplify the presentation we assume that x0 =0 . This does not change
the sign of the dynamics of these two variables.
16Finally, the consumer price can be simply calculated by the addition of
the monopoly price and tariﬀ.













so we can conclude that
Proposition 5 The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rate decreases
throughout the exploitation period of the resource and converges to zero in
the long run. Moreover, the monopoly and consumer prices are increasing
and converge to the backstop price.
Clearly, these results establish that the commitment that the open-loop
Nash equilibrium requires for the importing countries, a commitment for the
entire exploitation period of the resource, drastically reduces the possibilities
of using a tariﬀ to capture part of the monopoly’s rents. In other words,
the importing country governments have to play feedback strategies, i.e., to
deﬁne the optimal policy as a function of the accumulated extractions, in
order to be able to impose an advantageous tariﬀ for the consumers.
4 The Case of a Quantity-setting Monopolist
Until now we have assumed that the monopoly chooses the price and the
market establishes the resource extraction rate. In this section we analyze
the other possibility the monopoly has: to choose the quantity and leave the
market to set up the price. In this case by substitution of the inverse demand












p(Q,¯ θ)(1 + θi)
¢
, (37)
where ¯ θ is the vector of the tariﬀ rates.
As the extraction rate is determined by the monopolist, the governments
of the importing countries have no inﬂuence on the dynamics of the stock.
For this reason, in this case the tariﬀ rate is given by the Nash equilibrium
o ft h es t a t i cg a m ed e ﬁned by (37). In other words, at each point in time the
importing countries choose a tariﬀ rate to maximize the instantaneous ﬂow
of the consumer’s welfare given the extraction rate and the rival’s tariﬀ rates.











































,i =1 ,...,n. (38)
This is the version for an “ad valorem” tariﬀ of the one obtained by Karp
and Newbery (1991, p. 288) for a per unit tariﬀ.
Assuming that the system (38) has a unique solution, the dynamic of the
extraction rate and hence the dynamics of the tariﬀ rate can be calculated as
the solution of a standard optimal control problem.12 This result shows that
the nature of the game changes when the monopoly sets the quantity instead
of the price. Now at each moment, given the extraction rate, the importing
countries can use the tariﬀs to reduce the monopoly price and in this way,
increase domestic welfare.
4.1 A Tariﬀ Agreement: The Markov-Perfect Stackel-
berg Equilibrium
In order to complete the analysis of the previous section we look now at the
game between the monopolist and the coalition of the importing countries.
When the monopolist chooses the extraction rate, the monopoly price de-
pends on the tariﬀ selected by the countries in the tariﬀ agreement according
to the demand inverse function
p = a − θ − (Q/n), (39)
so that the instantaneous aggregate welfare of the importing country con-























12For a linear demand the existence of a solution could be shown at least for the sym-
metric case although not the uniqueness. For a per unit tariﬀ both the existence and the
uniqueness can be shown.
18From this expression it is pretty obvious that the optimal policy is to choose,
for a given quantity, a tariﬀ such that the price be zero: θ = a − (Q/n).
However, in this case, the monopoly has no interest in exploiting the re-
source so that ﬁn a l l yi nt h eo p e n - l o o pN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m e ,t h e
importing countries are not going to obtain any surplus. Given this result
and the structure of the game, we think that a Stackelberg equilibrium bet-
ter represents the relationship between the countries in the tariﬀ agreement
and the monopolist. What happens is that the inﬂuence of the tariﬀ rate on
the monopoly price gives a strategic advantage to the countries in the tariﬀ
agreement so that they can behave as a leader.13 Next, we show that the
importing countries are interested in establishing a tariﬀ that gives the mo-
nopolist the possibility of obtaining a positive price with the aim of obtaining
a positive surplus for their consumers. A policy that is clearly superior to
the one established above.
Since it is well known that an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium besides
not being subgame perfect (strong time inconsistency) can also be temporally
inconsistent (weak time inconsistency),we propose in this section to calculate
a Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium which will satisfy the weak time
consistency as well. The method of obtaining a Markov-perfect Stackelberg
equilibrium we use in this paper was ﬁrst proposed by Simaan and Cruz
(1973). The method is for the leader to treat the follower’s HJB equation as
a constraint, and to solve his own problem using dynamic programming.
In order to calculate this kind of equilibrium we need the instantaneous
reaction function of the follower, i.e., of the monopolist, which is obtained
from the following HJB equation where the price is given by (39)
rWM =m a x
{Q}
{(a − θ − (Q/n) − cx)Q + W
0
MQ}.





(a − θ − cx + W
0
M), (40)
the monopoly’s instantaneous reaction function.
Then the HJB equation for the coalition of the importing country gov-
13Lewis, Lindsey and Ware (1986) have analyzed the interaction between a resource
monopolist and a coalition of consumers that act collectively to introduce a durable long-
lived substitute. They compare the equilibrium predictions of a non-commitment model
with two other models where the monopolist and the resource consumer act as time-
committed Stackelberg leaders.
19ernments can be written as
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where (39) and (40) have been used to calculate the monopoly price and re-
source importations q = Q/n. The ﬁrst-order condition for the maximization
of the right-hand side of this equation yields the optimal policy or strategy


















By substitution of the optimal tariﬀ into the HJB equation of the import-
ing country governments and of the tariﬀ and extraction rates into the HJB
equation of the monopoly, we eliminate the maximization and obtain, after



















Now, proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, we get the


























By visual inspection it can be seen that the tariﬀ a n de x t r a c t i o nr a t e s
are inversely related to the accumulated extractions.
Since ˙ x = Q, we can use (47) to calculate the dynamics of the accumulated



















































and adding this price to the tariﬀ rate, the consumer price is













so we can conclude that
Proposition 6 The Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium tariﬀ and ex-
traction rates decrease throughout the exploitation period of the resource and
converge to zero in the long run. Moreover, the monopoly and consumer
prices are increasing and converge to the backstop price.
This result along with the previous one, Prop. 5, establish that it is
advantageous for the importing countries to coordinate and impose a common
tariﬀ on the resource importations, both if the monopoly chooses the price
and if the monopoly chooses the extraction rate. However, in this second
case, the importing countries enjoy a strategic advantage and can impose a
higher tariﬀ rate as we show in the next section.
5 Comparing the Two Equilibria
This section compares the Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and the Stackelberg
equilibrium in which importing countries act as a leader (MPSE). First, we
compare the initial values of the optimal strategies.
Lemma 1 The initial consumer price and tariﬀ rate are lower and the initial
monopoly price is higher in the MPNE than in the MPSE.
21Proof. See Appendix B.
This result establishes that the strategic advantage of the importing coun-
try governments translates into a higher initial value for the tariﬀ,w h i c hr e -
duces the demand for the resource. The reduction in initial demand explains
why the initial monopoly price is lower in the MPSE. Thus, a higher tariﬀ
has two eﬀects on the consumer price: one direct and positive and another
indirect and negative through the monopoly price. The net eﬀect is posi-
tive because the reduction in demand does not completely translate into the
monopoly price, given that the demand function is linear and the marginal
extraction cost is constant. Hence, the initial consumer price is lower in the
MPNE although the monopoly price is higher.
We now turn to the transitional dynamics.
Proposition 7 The tariﬀ in the MPSE is above the MPNE tariﬀ.C o n t r a r -
ily, the monopoly price in the MPSE is below the MPNE monopoly price.
However, the consumer price in the MPSE is ﬁrst above, but later below, the
MPNE consumer price.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result is a logical consequence of the fact that both equilibria con-
verge to the same long run equilibrium characterized by the economic ex-
haustion of the resource. Accordingly, the total amount mined is the same —
irrespective of the equilibrium concept used to solve the game - and the area
under the temporal path of the extraction rate must therefore be the same as
well. The temporal paths must thus intersect. The monotonic behaviour of
the variables explains why the paths intersect only once. The intersection of
the temporal paths of the extraction rate occurs along with the intersection
of the temporal paths of the consumer price. However, for the tariﬀ and
monopoly price there are no intersection points. This is possible because
of the inverse relationship between the tariﬀ and monopoly price for both
equilibria. In the MPSE the tariﬀ is higher than the tariﬀ in the MPNE
whereas the monopoly price is lower. Then as the consumer price is given
by the tariﬀ plus the monopoly price, the consumer price can be ﬁrst higher,
a n dl a t e rl o w e r ,i nt h eM P S Et h a ni nt h eM P N E .
Moreover, it is easy to show that although the leadership position is ad-
vantageous for the importing countries, the eﬃciency of the market decreases.
This is a standard result in the comparison between the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria that we do not show here.14
14It is easy to show for x0 = 0 that when the importing country governments have a
strategic advantage, the aggregate consumer’s welfare increases while the monopoly’s rent
and aggregate welfare (measured as the aggregate consumer’s welfare plus monopoly’s
226 Conclusions
In this paper we have revisited the issue, ﬁrst tackled by Bergstrom (1982), of
using a tariﬀ on a nonrenewable resource importations in order to appropriate
part of the resource rents. We extend the analysis taking into account that
the exploitation of nonrenewable resources is characterized by the presence
of depletion eﬀects, i.e., the marginal extraction cost increases for the same
extraction rate as the accumulated extractions increase. For the case of a
competitive market we ﬁnd that the optimal policy is a constant tariﬀ if
extraction is costless. This result supports Bergstrom’s ﬁnding. However,
with depletion eﬀects, the optimal tariﬀ must be ultimately decreasing.
For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the
kind of strategies the importing country governments play and on whether
the monopolist chooses the price or the extraction rate. For a price-setting
monopolist we show that the importing countries cannot use a tariﬀ to cap-
ture the monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies,
i.e., if they commit to a temporal path for the tariﬀ,e v e ni ft h eg o v e r n m e n t s
sign a tariﬀ agreement to impose the same tariﬀ. This result drastically
changes if the importing countries co-operate through a tariﬀ agreement and
use Markov (feedback) strategies, i.e., if they commit to a rule that ﬁxes
the tariﬀ as a function of the accumulated extractions (the state variable of
the game). In this case a tariﬀ is clearly advantageous for the consumers
of the importing countries. For a quantity-setting monopolist the nature of
the game changes, in fact, for the importing country governments the game
becomes a static game and now the importing countries ﬁnd it advantageous
to set a tariﬀ on resource importations. Finally, we show that when the
governments of the importing countries sign a tariﬀ agreement they enjoy a
strategic advantage which allows them to act as the leader of the game.
Although we think that this paper clariﬁes and extends the analysis of
the possibilities of using a tariﬀ to capture nonrenewable resource rents it
would be of interest to address this issue when there is no cooperation among
the importing country governments for the case of a price-setting monopolist.
In particular, we have calculated the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a
diﬀerential game between a coalition of importing country governments and
a monopolist that sets the price but, although we guess that the qualitative
result is not going to change, it would be useful to know whether the import-
ing countries can gain by imposing a feedback tariﬀ without coordination,
rent) decrease, compared with the MPNE. Notice that for x0 =0t h ec o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e n
the value functions of the importing countries and the monopoly reduces to the comparison
of the independent term of the quadratic representations. See, for instance, the welfare
analysis developed in Rubio and Escriche (2001).
23i.e., without signing a tariﬀ agreement.
A Derivation of the Stationary Linear Markov
Strategies
Substituting WA,W 0
A,W M and W0
M into (29) and (30), collecting terms
with equal powers of x, and equating the coeﬃcients of these terms to zero,
one obtains the following system of coupled Riccati equations
4rαA = n(c − αA − αM)
2, (52)
2rαM = n(c − αA − αM)
2, (53)
4rβA = −n(a + βA + βM)(c − αA − αM), (54)
2rβM = −n(a + βA + βM)(c − αA − αM). (55)
These equations can be explicitly solved by the following change in the
variables: y = αA + αM and z = βA + βM. Adding the ﬁrst two equations
and the last two equations yields a system in the new variables
4ry =3 n(c − y)
2, (56)
4rz = −3n(a + z)(c − y). (57)
The solution for the ﬁrst equation is









In order to choose between the two roots a stability condition is used.
Next, we develop this stability condition. Using the proposed value functions
the linear Markov strategies can be written as
θ = −αAx − βA,p =
1
2
(a + βA − βM +( c + αA − αM)x), (59)




(a + βA + βM − (c − αA − αM)x).









(c − αA − αM)=−
n
2
(c − y) < 0,
24so that the stability condition requires that c − y>0. This condition is
satisﬁed by the lowest root of (58) yielding































Finally, by substitution in (59) we obtain the linear Makov-perfect Nash
equilibrium strategies for the tariﬀ and the price (32) and (33).
B Proof of Lemma 1
Let us suppose that θ
S(0) ≤ θ
N(0).15 Then using (35) and (49) for t =0w e
obtain after obvious simpliﬁcations that 36cr+16nγ2 ≤ 27nδ
2. In Appendix
Aw eh a v ee s t a b l i s ht h a t4 ryN =3 n(c−yN)2 =3 nδ
2,s e e( 5 6 ) .O nt h eo t h e r
hand, the Riccati equations for the MPSE yield 9ryS =5 n(c − yS)2 =5 nγ2
where γ = c − yS by deﬁnition. Then by substitution of nγ2 and nδ
2 in the
above inequality we obtain that 5δ +yS ≤ 0. Developing 9ryS =5 n(c−yS)2
we obtain the following quadratic equation (yS)2−(2c+(9r/5n))yS +c2 =0
which has two positive roots, the lowest root being the one that satisﬁes the
stability condition so that γ = c−yS > 0. Then as δ is positive, see (60) and




Next, we compare the initial monopoly prices. Let us suppose that
pS(0) ≥ pN(0). Then using (35) and (50) for t = 0 we obtain after obvi-
ous simpliﬁcations that 54rγ +24nγ2 ≤ 27rδ. Using again that 9ryS =5 nγ2
we obtain after substituting nγ2 in the previous inequality and rearranging
15Superscript N stands for the MPNE and S for the MPSE.
25terms that 81c+54γ +135yN ≤ 0. Where yN i st h el o w e s tr o o to f( 5 8 ) .I ti s
very easy to show that this root is positive so that a contradiction is estab-
lished since γ is also positive. Then we have that pS(0) <p N(0). Finally, we





















































Let us suppose that this diﬀerence is negative or zero. Then we can write
reordering terms and simplifying
10(3cnr + r
2)
0.5 ≤ r +3 ( 2 0 cnr +9 r
2)
0.5.
Squaring, reordering terms and squari n ga g a i nw eh a v et h ec o n t r a d i c t i o n :
4cn + r ≤ 0. Thus, we obtain that πS(0) > πN(0), which also implies that
δ/2 − γ/3 is positive.
C Proof of Proposition 7
For the comparison of the tariﬀ temporal paths, we use (35) and (49). The




















For t = 0 we know from Lemma 1 that the diﬀerence θ
S(0)−θ
N(0) is positive.
For t 6=0w ec a nﬁnd the number of intersection points from the equation
θ
S − θ


















26However, this equation has no solution for t ≥ 0 since the l.h.s. is a positive
constant less than one and the r.h.s. is an increasing and convex function
which takes the unit value for t = 0, and tends to inﬁnity when t tends to
inﬁnity since as it has been shown in Lemma 1 δ/2−γ/3 is positive. Hence,
the temporal path of the MPSE tariﬀ is above the temporal path of the
MPNE in the interval [0,∞). T h es a m ep r o c e d u r ec a nb eu s e dt os h o wt h a t
the temporal path of the MPSE monopoly price is below the temporal path
of the MPNE in the interval [0,∞). For comparing the temporal paths of the
consumer price we calculate the diﬀerence between the two temporal paths
























and we can ﬁnd the number of intersection points from the equation θ
S−θ
N =
















where the l.h.s. is a positive constant higher than one and the r.h.s. is an
increasing and convex function which takes the unit value for t =0 ,a n d
tends to inﬁnity when t tends to inﬁnity as we have just seen. Hence, the
temporal paths cut each other once in the interval [0,∞), and consequently,
for 0 ≤ t<t 0,w h e r et0 is the solution to Eq. (63), the MPSE consumer price
is above the MPNE consumer price, whereas for t0 <tthe relationship is the
contrary.
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